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a b s t r a c t 
Risk assessment and management was established as a scientiﬁc ﬁeld some 30–40 years ago. Principles 
and methods were developed for how to conceptualise, assess and manage risk. These principles and 
methods still represent to a large extent the foundation of this ﬁeld today, but many advances have been 
made, linked to both the theoretical platform and practical models and procedures. The purpose of the 
present invited paper is to perform a review of these advances, with a special focus on the fundamental 
ideas and thinking on which these are based. We have looked for trends in perspectives and approaches, 
and we also reﬂect on where further development of the risk ﬁeld is needed and should be encouraged. 
The paper is written for readers with different types of background, not only for experts on risk. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY license ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ). 
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0. Introduction 
The concept of risk and risk assessments has a long history.
ore than 2400 years ago the Athenians offered their capacity of
ssessing risk before making decisions ( Bernstein, 1996 ). However,
isk assessment and risk management as a scientiﬁc ﬁeld is young,
ot more than 30–40 years old. From this period we see the ﬁrst
cientiﬁc journals, papers and conferences covering fundamental
deas and principles on how to appropriately assess and manage
isk. 
To a large extent, these ideas and principles still form the basis
or the ﬁeld today—they are the building blocks for the risk assess-
ent and management practice we have seen since the 1970s and
980s. However, the ﬁeld has developed considerably since then.
ew and more sophisticated analysis methods and techniques have
een developed, and risk analytical approaches and methods are
ow used in most societal sectors. As an illustration of this, con-
ider the range of specialty groups of the Society for Risk Anal-
sis ( www.sra.org ) covering inter alia: Dose Response, Ecological
isk Assessment, Emerging Nanoscale Materials, Engineering and
nfrastructure, Exposure Assessment, Microbial Risk Analysis, Occu-
ational Health and Safety, Risk Policy and Law, and Security and
efense. Advances have also been made in fundamental issues for
he ﬁeld in recent years, and they are of special interest as they
re generic and have the potential to inﬂuence a broad set of ap-
lications. These advances are the scope of the present paper. ∗ Tel.: + 47832267; fax: + 4751831750. 
E-mail address: terje.aven@uis.no 
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(
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2015.12.023 
377-2217/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article uThe risk ﬁeld has two main tasks, (I) to use risk assessments
nd risk management to study and treat the risk of speciﬁc ac-
ivities (for example the operation of an offshore installation or
n investment), and (II) to perform generic risk research and de-
elopment, related to concepts, theories, frameworks, approaches,
rinciples, methods and models to understand, assess, characterise,
ommunicate and (in a wide sense) manage/govern risk ( Aven &
io, 2014; SRA, 2015b ). The generic part (II) provides the concepts
nd the assessment and management tools to be used in the spe-
iﬁc assessment and management problems of (I). Simpliﬁed, we
an say that the risk ﬁeld is about understanding the world (in re-
ation to risk) and how we can and should understand, assess and
anage this world. 
The aim of the present paper is to perform a review of recent
dvances made in the risk ﬁeld, having a special focus on the fun-
amental ideas and thinking that form the generic risk research
II). The scope of such a review is broad, and it has been a chal-
enge to select works for this review from among the many sem-
nal contributions made over the past 10–15 years. Only works
hat might reasonably be considered to contribute to the foun-
ations of the ﬁeld have been included. Priority has been given
o works that are judged to be of special contemporary interest
nd importance, recognising the subjectivity of the selection and a
eliberate bias towards rather recent papers and the areas of in-
erest of the author of this manuscript. For reviews and discus-
ions of the early development of the risk ﬁeld, see Henley and
umamoto (1981), Covello and Mumpower (1985), Rechard (1999 ,
0 0 0 ), Bedford and Cooke (2001), Thompson, Deisler, and Schwing
2005) and Zio (2007b) . nder the CC BY license ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ). 
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o  The following main topics will be covered: Risk analysis and
science; risk conceptualisation; uncertainty in risk assessment; risk
management principles and strategies, having a special focus on
confronting large/deep uncertainties, surprises and the unforeseen;
and the future of risk assessment and management. 
Special attention will be devoted to contributions that can be
seen as a result of an integrative thinking process, a thinking which
per deﬁnition reﬂects a strong “ability to face constructively the
tension of opposing ideas and instead of choosing one at the ex-
pense of the other, generate a creative resolution of the tension
in the form of a new idea that contains elements of the opposing
ideas but is superior to each” ( Martin, 2009 , p. 15). As an example,
think about the conceptualisation of risk. There are a number of
different deﬁnitions, which can be said to create tension. However,
integrative thinking stimulates the search for perspectives that ex-
tend beyond these deﬁnitions—it uses the opposing ideas to reach
a new level of understanding. The coming review will point to
work in this direction and discuss trends we see in the risk re-
search. 
2. The risk ﬁeld and science 
Generic risk research (II) to a large extent deﬁnes the risk sci-
ence. However, applications of type (I) may also be scientiﬁc if
the work contributes to new insights, for example a better un-
derstanding of how to conduct a speciﬁc risk assessment method
in practice. Rather few publications have been presented on this
topic, discussing issues linking science and scientiﬁc criteria on the
one hand, and risk and the risk ﬁelds on the other. Lately, how-
ever, several fundamental discussions of this topic have appeared.
These have contributed to clarifying the content of the risk ﬁeld
and its scientiﬁc basis; see Hansson and Aven (2014), Hollnagel
(2014), Hale (2014), Le Coze, Pettersen, and Reiman (2014) and
Aven (2014) . Here are some key points made. 
We should distinguish between the risk ﬁeld characterised by
the totality of relevant risk educational programmes, journals, pa-
pers, researchers, research groups and societies, etc. (we may refer
to it as a risk discipline), and the risk ﬁeld covering the knowledge
generation of (I) and (II). 
This understanding (I and II) is in line with a perspective on
science as argued for by Hansson (2013) , stating that science is the
practice that provides us with the epistemically most warranted
statements that can be made, at the time being, on subject mat-
ters covered by the community of knowledge disciplines, i.e. on
nature, ourselves as human beings, our societies, our physical con-
structions, and our thought constructions ( Hansson, 2013 ). By pub-
lishing papers in journals, we are thus contributing to developing
the risk science. 
The boundaries between the two levels (I) and (II) are not strict.
Level II research and development is to a varying degree generic
for the risk ﬁeld. Some works are truly generic in the sense that
they are relevant for all types of applications, but there are many
levels of generality. Some research may have a scope which mainly
covers some areas of applications, or just one, but which is still
fundamental for all types of applications in these areas. For exam-
ple, a paper can address how to best conceptualise risk in a busi-
ness context and have rather limited interest outside this area. 
Consider as an example the supply chain risk management
area, which has quite recently developed from an emerging topic
into a growing research ﬁeld ( Fahimnia, Tang, Davarzani, & Sarkis,
2015 ). The work by Fahimnia et al. (2015) presents a review
of quantitative and analytical models (i.e. mathematical, opti-
misation and simulation modelling effort s) f or managing supply
chain risks and points to generative research areas that have pro-
vided the ﬁeld with foundational knowledge, concepts, theories,
tools, and techniques. Examples of work of special relevancy herenclude Blackhurst and Wu (2009), Brandenburg, Govindan, Sarkis,
nd Seuring (2014), Heckmann, Comes, and Nickel (2015), Jüttner,
eck, and Christopher (2003), Peck (2006), Tang and Zhou (2012),
sidisin (2003) and Zsidisin and Ritchie (2010) . These works cover
ontributions to (I) but also (II), although they are to a varying de-
ree relevant for other application areas. 
As an example of (I), consider the analysis in Tang (2006) ,
peciﬁcally addressing what are the risks that are most relevant
or the supply chain area. Although not looking at a speciﬁc sys-
em, it is more natural to categorise the analysis in (I) than (II),
s the work has rather limited relevance for areas outside supply
hain management. Another example illustrates the spectre of situ-
tions between (I) and (II). Tang and Musa (2011) highlight that the
nderstanding of what risk is deﬁnitely represents a research chal-
enge in supply chain management. Heckmann et al. (2015) review
ommon perspectives on risk in supply chain management and
utline ideas for how to best conceptualise risk, and clearly this
ype of research is foundational for the supply chain area, but not
or the risk ﬁeld in general. The work by Heckmann et al. (2015) is
n line with current generic trends on risk conceptualisation as for
xample summarised by SRA (2015a, 2015b ), with respect to some
ssues, but not others (see a comment about this in Section 3 ). This
s a challenge for all types of applications: transfer of knowledge
nd experience are diﬃcult to obtain across areas, and we often
ee that the different ﬁelds develop tailor-made concepts, which
re not up-to-date relative to the developments of the generic
isk ﬁeld. This demonstrates the generic risk research’s need for
 stronger visibility and impact. On the other hand, the restricted
ork in speciﬁc areas can often motivate and be inﬂuential for
eneric risk research. The author of the present paper worked with
ffshore risk analysis applications, and issues raised there led to
eneric risk research about risk conceptualisation ( Aven, 2013a ).
here is a tension between different types of perspectives and
his can stimulate integrative and ground-breaking ideas. For an-
ther example of work in the borderline between (I) and (II), see
oerlandt and Montewka (2015) , related to maritime transporta-
ion risk. See also Aven and Renn (2015) , who discuss the foun-
ation of the risk and uncertainty work of the Intergovernmental
anel on Climate Change (IPCC) which is the principal international
uthority assessing climate risk. This discussion addresses a spe-
iﬁc application and is thus of type (I), but it is strongly based on
eneric risk research (II). 
Next we will discuss in more detail how science is related to
ey risk assessment and risk management activities, in particular
he process in which science is used as a base for decision-making
n risk. A key element in this discussion is the concept “knowl-
dge”. 
.1. Science, knowledge and decision-making 
In Hansson and Aven (2014) a model which partly builds on
deas taken from Hertz and Thomas (1983) , is presented, show-
ng the links between facts and values in risk decision-making; see
ig. 1. 
Data and information, gathered through testing and analysis,
bout a phenomenon provides the evidence. These data and in-
ormation contribute to a knowledge base which is the collection
f all “truths” (legitimate truth claims) and beliefs that the rele-
ant group of experts and scientists take as given in further re-
earch and analysis in the ﬁeld. The evidence and the knowledge
ase are supposed to be free of non-epistemic values. Such values
re presumed to be added only in the third stage. Concluding that
n activity is safe enough is a judgement based on both science
nd values. The interpretation of the knowledge base is often quite
omplicated since it has to be performed against the background
f general scientiﬁc knowledge. We may have tested a product
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Evidence
Knowledge 
base 
Broad
risk 
evaluaon
Decision
maker’s
review
Decision
Fact-based
Value-based
Experts Decision maker 
Fig. 1. A model for linking the various stages in the risk informed decision-making 
(based on Hansson & Aven, 2014 ). 
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d  xtensively and studied its mechanism in great detail, but there
s no way to exclude very rare occurrences of failures that could
aterialise 25 years into the future. Although the decision to dis-
egard such possibilities is far from value-free, it cannot in practice
e made by laypeople, since it requires deep understanding of the
vailable evidence seen in relation to our general knowledge about
he phenomena studied. 
This leads us into the risk evaluation step, as shown in Fig. 1 .
his is a step where the knowledge base is evaluated and a sum-
ary judgement is reached on the risk and uncertainties involved
n the case under investigation. This evaluation has to take the
alues of the decision-makers into account, and a careful distinc-
ion has to be made between the scientiﬁc burden of proof – the
mount of evidence required to treat an assertion as part of cur-
ent scientiﬁc knowledge – and the practical burden of proof in a
articular decision. However, the evaluation is so entwined with
cientiﬁc issues that it nevertheless has to be performed by scien-
iﬁc experts. Many of the risk assessment reports emanating from
arious scientiﬁc and technical committees perform this function.
hese committees regularly operate in a “no man’s land” between
cience and policy, and it is no surprise that they often ﬁnd them-
elves criticised on value-based grounds. 
But the judgments do not stop there, the decision-makers need
o see beyond the risk evaluation; they need to combine the
isk information they have received with information from other
ources and on other topics. In Fig. 1 we refer to this as the
ecision-maker’s review and judgement. It goes clearly beyond the
cientiﬁc ﬁeld and will cover value-based considerations of differ-
nt types. It may also include policy-related considerations on risk
nd safety that were not covered in the expert review. Just like the
xpert’s review, it is based on a combination of factual and value-
ased considerations. 
Above we have referred to “knowledge” a number of times, but
hat is its meaning in this context? The new SRA glossary refers
o two types of knowledge: 
“know-how (skill) and know-that of propositional knowledge
(justiﬁed beliefs). Knowledge is gained through for example sci-
entiﬁc methodology and peer-review, experience and testing.”
( SRA, 2015a ) 
However, studying the scientiﬁc literature on knowledge as
uch, the common perspective is not justiﬁed beliefs but justiﬁed
rue beliefs. The SRA (2015a ) glossary challenges this deﬁnition.
ven (2014) presents some examples for this view, including this
ne: “A group of experts believe that a system will not be able
o withstand a speciﬁc load. Their belief is based on data and in-
ormation, modelling and analysis. But they can be wrong. It is
iﬃcult to ﬁnd a place for a “truth requirement”. Who can say
n advance what is the truth? Yet the experts have some knowl-
dge about the phenomena. A probability assignment can be made,
or example that the system will withstand the load with proba-
ility 0.01, and then the knowledge is considered partly reﬂected
n the probability, partly in the background knowledge that thisrobability is based on”. The above knowledge deﬁnition of sci-
nce and the model of Fig. 1 work perfectly in case of the “justi-
ed belief” interpretation of knowledge, but not for the “justiﬁed
rue belief” interpretation. 
From such a view the term ‘justiﬁed’ becomes critical. In line
ith Hansson (2013) , it refers to being the result of a scientiﬁc
rocess—meeting some criteria set by the scientiﬁc environment
or the process considered. For example, in the case of the sys-
em load above, these criteria relate to the way the risk assess-
ent is conducted, that the rules of probability are met, etc. Aven
nd Heide (2009) , see also Aven (2011a) , provide an in-depth dis-
ussion of such criteria. A basic requirement is that the analysis is
olid/sound (follows standard protocols for scientiﬁc work like be-
ng in compliance with all rules and assumptions made, the basis
or all choices are made clear, etc.). In addition, criteria of relia-
ility and validity should be met. The reliability requirement here
elates to the extent to which the risk assessment yields the same
esults when repeating the analysis, and the validity requirement
efers to the degree to which the risk assessment describes the
peciﬁc concepts that one is attempting to describe. Adopting these
riteria, the results (beliefs) of the risk assessments can to a vary-
ng degree be judged as “justiﬁed”. 
As shown by Aven and Heide (2009) and Aven (2011a) , this
valuation depends strongly on the risk perspective adopted. If the
eference is the “traditional scientiﬁc method”, standing on the pil-
ars of accurate estimations and predictions, the criteria of reli-
bility and validity would fail in general, in particular when the
ncertainties are large. The problems for the risk assessments in
eeting the requirements of the traditional scientiﬁc method were
iscussed as early as in 1981 by Alvin M. Weinberg and Robert
. Cumming in their editorials of the ﬁrst issue of the Risk Analy-
is journal, in relation to the establishment of the Society for Risk
nalysis ( Weinberg, 1981 ; Cumming, 1981 ). However, a risk assess-
ent can also be seen as a tool used to represent and describe
nowledge and lack of knowledge, and then other criteria need to
e used to evaluate reliability and validity, and whether the assess-
ent is a scientiﬁc method. 
This topic is discussed by Hansson and Aven (2014) . They give
ome examples of useful science-based decision support in line
ith these ideas: 
- Characterisations of the robustness of natural, technological,
and social systems and their interactions. 
- Characterisations of uncertainties, and of the robustness of dif-
ferent types of knowledge that are relevant for risk manage-
ment, and of ways in which some of these uncertainties can be
reduced and the knowledge made more robust. 
- Investigations aimed at uncovering speciﬁc weaknesses or lacu-
nae in the knowledge on which risk management is based. 
- Studies of successes and failures in previous responses to sur-
prising and unforeseen events. 
Returning to the concept of integrative thinking introduced in
ection 1 , we may point to the tension between the ideas that
isk assessment fails to meet the criteria of the traditional scientiﬁc
ethod, and that it should be a solid and useful method for sup-
orting risk decision-making. The result of a shift in perspective
or the risk assessment, from accurate risk estimation to knowl-
dge and lack of knowledge characterisations, can be viewed as a
esult of such thinking. We will discuss this change in perspective
or the risk assessments further in Section 6 . 
. Risk conceptualisation 
Several attempts have been made to establish broadly accepted
eﬁnitions of key terms related to concepts fundamental for the
4 T. Aven / European Journal of Operational Research 253 (2016) 1–13 
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a  risk ﬁeld; see e.g. Thompson et al. (2005) . A scientiﬁc ﬁeld or disci-
pline needs to stand solidly on well-deﬁned and universally under-
stood terms and concepts. Nonetheless, experience has shown that
to agree on one uniﬁed set of deﬁnitions is not realistic. This was
the point of departure for a thinking process conducted recently by
an expert committee of the Society for Risk Analysis (SRA), which
resulted in a new glossary for SRA ( SRA, 2015a ). The glossary is
founded on the idea that it is still possible to establish authorita-
tive deﬁnitions, the key being to allow for different perspectives on
fundamental concepts and to make a distinction between overall
qualitative deﬁnitions and their associated measurements. We will
focus here on the risk concept, but the glossary also covers related
terms such as probability, vulnerability, robustness and resilience. 
Allowing for different perspectives does not mean that all deﬁ-
nitions that can be found in the literature are included in the glos-
sary: the deﬁnitions included have to meet some basic criteria –
a rationale – such as being logical, well-deﬁned, understandable,
precise, etc. ( SRA, 2015a ). 
In the following we summarise the risk deﬁnition text from SRA
(2015a ): 
We consider a future activity (interpreted in a wide sense to
also cover, for example, natural phenomena), for example the op-
eration of a system, and deﬁne risk in relation to the consequences
of this activity with respect to something that humans value. The
consequences are often seen in relation to some reference values
(planned values, objectives, etc.), and the focus is normally on neg-
ative, undesirable consequences. There is always at least one out-
come that is considered as negative or undesirable. 
Overall qualitative deﬁnitions of risk : 
(a) the possibility of an unfortunate occurrence, 
(b) the potential for realisation of unwanted, negative conse-
quences of an event, 
(c) exposure to a proposition (e.g. the occurrence of a loss) of
which one is uncertain, 
(d) the consequences of the activity and associated uncertain-
ties, 
(e) uncertainty about and severity of the consequences of an ac-
tivity with respect to something that humans value, 
(f) the occurrences of some speciﬁed consequences of the ac-
tivity and associated uncertainties, 
(g) the deviation from a reference value and associated uncer-
tainties. 
These deﬁnitions express basically the same idea, adding the un-
certainty dimension to events and consequences. ISO deﬁnes risk
as the effect of uncertainty on objectives ( ISO, 20 09a, 20 09b ). It
is possible to interpret this deﬁnition in different ways; one as a
special case of those considered above, e.g. (d) or (g). 
To describe or measure risk—to make judgements about how
large or small the risk is, we use various metrics: 
3.1. Risk metrics/descriptions (examples) 
1. The combination of probability and magnitude/severity of con-
sequences. 
2. The triplet ( s i , p i , c i ), where s i is the i th scenario, p i is the prob-
ability of that scenario, and c i is the consequence of the ith sce-
nario, i = 1,2, …N . 
3. The triplet ( C ’, Q , K ), where C ’ is some speciﬁed consequences,
Q a measure of uncertainty associated with C ’ (typically prob-
ability) and K the background knowledge that supports C ’ and
Q (which includes a judgement of the strength of this knowl-
edge). 
4. Expected consequences (damage, loss), for example computed
by: i. Expected number of fatalities in a speciﬁc period of time or
the expected number of fatalities per unit of exposure time.
ii. The product of the probability of the hazard occurring and
the probability that the relevant object is exposed given the
hazard, and the expected damage given that the hazard oc-
curs and the object is exposed to it (the last term is a vul-
nerability metric). 
iii. Expected disutility. 
5. A possibility distribution for the damage (for example a trian-
gular possibility distribution). 
The suitability of these metrics/descriptions depends on the sit-
ation. None of these examples can be viewed as risk itself, and
he appropriateness of the metric/description can always be ques-
ioned. For example, the expected consequences can be informative
or large populations and individual risk, but not otherwise. For a
peciﬁc decision situation, a selected set of metrics have to be de-
ermined meeting the need for decision support. 
To illustrate the thinking, consider the personnel risk related to
otential accidents on an offshore installation. Then, if risk is de-
ned according to (d), in line with the recommendations in for ex-
mple PSA-N (2015) and Aven, Baraldi, Flage, and Zio (2014) , risk
as two dimensions: the consequences of the operation covering
vents A such as gas leakages and blowouts, and their effects C
or human lives and health; as well as uncertainty U, we do not
now now which events will occur and what the effects will be;
e face risk. The risk is referred to as (A,C,U). To describe the risk,
s we do in the risk assessment, we are in general terms led to the
riplet ( C ′ , Q , K ), as deﬁned above. We may for example choose to
ocus on the number of fatalities, and then C ′ equals this number.
t is unknown at the time of the analysis, and we use a measure to
xpress the uncertainty. Probability is the most common tool, but
ther tools also exist, including imprecise (interval) probability and
epresentations based on the theories of possibility and evidence,
s well as qualitative approaches; see Section 4 and Aven et al.
2014), Dubois (2010), Baudrit, Guyonnet, and Dubois (2006) and
lage, Aven, Baraldi, and Zio (2014) . Arguments for seeing beyond
xpected values and probabilities in deﬁning and describing risk
re summarised in Aven (2012 , 2015c ); see also Section 4 . Aven
2012 ) provides a comprehensive overview of different categories
f risk deﬁnitions, having also a historical and development trend
erspective. It is to be seen as a foundation for the SRA (2015a )
lossary. 
The way we understand and describe risk strongly inﬂuences
he way risk is analysed and hence it may have serious implica-
ions for risk management and decision-making. There should be
o reason why some of the current perspectives should not be
iped out as they are simply misguiding the decision-maker in
any cases. The best example is the use of expected loss as a gen-
ral concept of risk. The uncertainty-founded risk perspectives (e.g.
ven et al., 2014; Aven & Renn, 2009; ISO, 2009a, 2009b; PSA-N,
015 ) indicate that we should also include the pure probability-
ased perspectives, as the uncertainties are not suﬃciently re-
ealed for these perspectives; see also discussion in Section 4 . By
tarting from the overall qualitative risk concept, we acknowledge
hat any tool we use needs to be treated as a tool. It always has
imitations and these must be given due attention. Through this
istinction we will more easily look for what is missing between
he overall concept and the tool. Without a proper framework clar-
fying the difference between the overall risk concept and how it is
eing measured, it is diﬃcult to know what to look for and make
mprovements in these tools ( Aven, 2012 ). 
The risk concept is addressed in all ﬁelds, whether ﬁnance,
afety engineering, health, transportation, security or supply chain
anagement ( Althaus, 2005 ). Its meaning is a topic of concern in
ll areas. Some areas seem to have found the answer a long time
T. Aven / European Journal of Operational Research 253 (2016) 1–13 5 
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l  go, for instance the nuclear industry, which has been founded
n the Kaplan and Garrick (1981) deﬁnition (the triplet scenar-
os, consequences and probabilities) for more than three decades;
thers acknowledge the need for further developments, such as in
he supply chain ﬁeld ( Heckmann et al., 2015 ). Heckmann et al.
2015) point to the lack of clarity in understanding what the sup-
ly chain risk concept means, and search for solutions. A new def-
nition is suggested: “Supply chain risk is the potential loss for a
upply chain in terms of its target values of eﬃciency and ef-
ectiveness evoked by uncertain developments of supply chain
haracteristics whose changes were caused by the occurrence of
riggering-events”. The authors highlight that “the real challenge in
he ﬁeld of supply chain risk management is still the quantiﬁcation
nd modeling of supply chain risk. To this date, supply chain risk
anagement suffers from the lack of a clear and adequate quanti-
ative measure for supply chain risk that respects the characteris-
ics of modern supply chains” ( Heckmann et al., 2015 ). 
We see a structure resembling the structure of the SRA glos-
ary, with a broad qualitative concept and metrics describing the
isk. The supply chain risk is just an example to illustrate the wide
et of applications that relate to risk. Although all areas have spe-
ial needs, they all face risk as framed in the set-up of the ﬁrst
aragraph of the SRA (2015a ) text above. There is no need to in-
ent the wheel for every new type of application. 
To illustrate the many types of issues associated with the chal-
enge of establishing suitable risk descriptions and metrics, an
xample from ﬁnance, business and operational research will be
rovided. It is beyond the scope of the present paper to provide
 comprehensive all-inclusive overview of contributions of this
ype. 
In ﬁnance, business and operational research there is consid-
rable work related to risk metrics, covering both moment-based
nd quantile-based metrics. The former category covers for ex-
mple expected loss functions and expected square loss, and the
atter category, Value-at-Risk (VaR), and Conditional Value-at-Risk
CVaR); see e.g. Natarajan, Pachamanova, and Sim (2009) . Research
s conducted to analyse their properties and explore how suc-
essful they are in providing informative risk descriptions in a
ecision-making context, under various conditions, for example for
 portfolio of projects or securities, and varying degree of uncer-
ainties related to the parameters of the probability models; see
.g. Natarajan et al. (2009), Shapiro (2013), Brandtner (2013) and
itra, Karathanasopoulos, Sermpinis, Christian, and Hood (2015) .
s these references show, the works often have a rigorous mathe-
atical and probabilistic basis, with strong pillars taken from eco-
omic theory such as the expected utility theory. 
. Uncertainty in risk assessments 
Uncertainty is a key concept in risk conceptualisation and risk
ssessments as shown in Section 3 . How to understand and deal
ith the uncertainties has been intensively discussed in the liter-
ture, from the early stages of risk assessment in the 1970s and
980s, until today. Still the topic is a central one. Flage et al.
2014) provide a recent perspective on concerns, challenges and
irections of development for representing and expressing uncer-
ainty in risk assessment. Probabilistic analysis is the predominant
ethod used to handle the uncertainties involved in risk analy-
is, both aleatory (representing variation) and epistemic (due to
ack of knowledge). For aleatory uncertainty there is broad agree-
ent about using probabilities with a limiting relative frequency
nterpretation. However, for representing and expressing epistemic
ncertainty, the answer is not so straightforward. Bayesian sub-
ective probability approaches are the most common, but many
lternatives have been proposed, including interval probabilities,ossibilistic measures, and qualitative methods. Flage et al. (2014)
xamine the problem and identify issues that are foundational for
ts treatment. See also the discussion note by Dubois (2010) . 
One of the issues raised relates to when subjective probability is
ot appropriate. The argument often seen is that if the background
nowledge is rather weak, then it will be diﬃcult or impossible to
ssign a subjective probability with some conﬁdence. However, a
ubjective probability can always be assigned. The problem is that
 speciﬁc probability assigned is considered to represent a stronger
nowledge than can be justiﬁed. Think of a situation where the as-
igner has no knowledge about a quantity x beyond the following:
he quantity x is in the interval [0, 1] and the most likely value of
 is ½. From this knowledge alone there is no way of representing
 speciﬁc probability distribution, rather we are led to the use of
ossibility theory; see Aven et al. (2014 , p. 46). Forcing the analyst
o assign one probability distribution, would mean the need to add
ome unavailable information. We are led to bounds of probability
istributions. 
Aven (2010) adds another perspective to this discussion. The
ey point is not only to represent the available knowledge but also
o use probability to express the beliefs of the experts. It is ac-
nowledged that these beliefs are subjective, but they nevertheless
upport the decision-making. From this view it is not either or;
robability and the alternative approaches supplement each other.
his issue is also discussed by Dubois (2010) . 
The experience of the present author is that advocators of non-
robabilistic approaches, such as possibility theory and evidence
heory, often lack an understanding of the subjective probability
oncept. If the concept is known, the interpretation often relates
o a betting interpretation, which is controversial ( Aven, 2013a ).
or a summary of arguments for why this interpretation should be
voided and replaced by a direct comparison approach, see Lindley
2006 , p. 38) and Aven (2013a) . This latter interpretation is as fol-
ows: the probability P ( A ) = 0.1 (say) means that the assessor com-
ares his/her uncertainty (degree of belief) about the occurrence of
he event A with the standard of drawing at random a speciﬁc ball
rom an urn that contains 10 balls ( Lindley, 2006 ). 
If subjective probabilities are used to express the uncertain-
ies, we also need to reﬂect on the knowledge that supports the
robabilities. Think of a decision-making context where some risk
nalysts produce some probabilistic risk metrics; in one case the
ackground knowledge is strong, in the other, weaker, but the
robabilities and metrics are the same. To meet this challenge one
an look for alternative approaches such as possibility theory and
vidence theory, but it is also possible to think differently, to try
o express qualitatively the strength of this knowledge to inform
he decision-makers. The results are then summarised in not only
robabilities P but the pair ( P ,SoK), where SoK provides some qual-
tative measures of the strength of the knowledge supporting P .
ork along these lines is reported in, for example, Flage and Aven
2009) and Aven (2014) , with criteria related to aspects like jus-
iﬁcation of assumptions made, amount of reliable and relevant
ata/information, agreement among experts and understanding of
he phenomena involved. 
Similar and related criteria are used in the so-called NUSAP
ystem (NUSAP: Numeral, Unit, Spread, Assessment, and Pedigree)
 Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1990, 1993; Kloprogge, van der Sluijs, & Pe-
ersen, 2005, 2011; Laes, Meskens, & van der Sluijs, 2011; van der
luijs et al., 2005a, 2005b ), originally designed for the purpose of
nalysis and diagnosis of uncertainty in science for policy by per-
orming a critical appraisal of the knowledge base behind the rel-
vant scientiﬁc information. 
See also discussion by Spiegelhalter and Riesch (2014) , who
rovide forms of expression of uncertainty within ﬁve levels:
vent, parameter and model uncertainty – and two extra-model
evels concerning acknowledged and unknown inadequacies in
6 T. Aven / European Journal of Operational Research 253 (2016) 1–13 
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i  the modelling process, including possible disagreements about the
framing of the problem. 
For interval probabilities, founded for example on possibility
theory and evidence theory, it is also meaningful and relevant
to consider the background knowledge and the strength of this
knowledge. Normally the background knowledge in the case of in-
tervals would be stronger than in the case of speciﬁc probability
assignments, but they would be less informative in the sense of
communicating the judgements of the experts making the assign-
ments. 
As commented by the authors of SRA (2015b) , many re-
searchers today are more relaxed than previously about using non-
probabilistic representations of uncertainty. The basic idea is that
probability is considered the main tool, but other approaches and
methods may be used and useful when credible probabilities can-
not easily be determined or agreed upon. For situations charac-
terised by large and “deep” uncertainties, there seems to be broad
acceptance of the need for seeing beyond probability. As we have
seen above, this does not necessarily mean the use of possibil-
ity theory or evidence theory. The combination of probability and
qualitative approaches represents an interesting alternative direc-
tion of research. Again we see elements of integrative thinking, us-
ing the tension between different perspectives for representing and
expressing uncertainties to obtain something new and more wide-
ranging and hopefully better. 
A central area of uncertainty in risk assessment is uncertainty
importance analysis. The challenge is to identify what are the
most critical and essential contributors to output uncertainties and
risk. Considerable work has been conducted in this area; see e.g.
Borgonovo (20 06 , 20 07 , 2015 ), Baraldi, Zio, and Compare (2009)
and Aven and Nøkland (2010) . In Aven and Nøkland (2010) a re-
thinking of the rationale for the uncertainty importance measures
is provided. It is questioned what information they give compared
to the traditional importance measures such as the improvement
potential and the Birnbaum measure. A new type of combined sets
of measures is introduced, based on an integration of a traditional
importance measure and a related uncertainty importance mea-
sure. Baraldi et al. (2009) have a similar scope, investigating how
uncertainties can inﬂuence the traditional importance measures,
and how one can reﬂect the uncertainties in the ranking of the
components or basic events. 
Models play an important role in risk assessments, and con-
siderable attention has been devoted to the issue of model un-
certainty over the years and also recently. Nevertheless, there has
been some lack of clarity in the risk ﬁeld regarding what this con-
cept means; compare, for example, Reinert and Apostolakis (2006),
Park, Amarchinta, and Grandhi (2010), Droguett and Mosleh (2013,
2014 ) and Aven and Zio (2013) . According to Aven and Zio (2013) ,
model uncertainty is to be interpreted as uncertainty about the
model error, deﬁned by g ( x ) − y , where y is the quantity we would
like to assess and g ( x ) is a model of y having some parameters
x . Different approaches for assessing this uncertainty can then be
used, including subjective probabilities. This set-up is discussed in
more detail in Bjerga, Aven, and Zio (2014) . 
5. Risk management principles and strategies 
Before looking into recent developments in fundamental risk
management principles and strategies, it is useful to review two
well-established pillars of risk management: (a) the main risk
management strategies available and (b) the structure of the risk
management process. 
For (a), three major strategies are commonly used to man-
age risk: risk-informed, cautionary/ precautionary and discursive
strategies ( Renn, 2008; SRA, 2015b ). The cautionary/precautionary
strategy is also referred to as a strategy of robustness andesilience. In most cases the appropriate strategy would be a mix-
ure of these three strategies. 
The risk-informed strategy refers to the treatment of risk –
voidance, reduction, transfer and retention – using risk assess-
ents in an absolute or relative way. The cautionary/precautionary
trategy highlights features like containment, the development of
ubstitutes, safety factors, redundancy in designing safety devices,
s well as strengthening of the immune system, diversiﬁcation of
he means for approaching identical or similar ends, design
f systems with ﬂexible response options and the improvement of
onditions for emergency management and system adaptation. An
mportant aspect here is the ability to adequately read signals and
he precursors of serious events. All risk regulations are based on
ome level of such principles to meet the uncertainties, risks and
he potential for surprises. The discursive strategy uses measures
o build conﬁdence and trustworthiness, through reduction of un-
ertainties and ambiguities, clariﬁcations of facts, involvement of
ffected people, deliberation and accountability ( Renn, 2008; SRA,
015b ). 
For (b), the process can be broken down into the following
teps (in line with what one ﬁnds in standards such as ISO 310 0 0
nd most risk analysis text books (e.g. Aven, 2015a; Meyer & Re-
iers, 2013; Zio, 2007a ): 
i. Establish context, which means for example to deﬁne the pur-
pose of the risk management activities, and specify goals and
criteria. 
ii. Identify situations and events (hazards/threats/opportunities)
that can affect the activity considered and objectives deﬁned.
Many methods have been developed for this task, including
checklists, HAZOP and FMEA. 
iii Conduct cause and consequences analysis of these events, using
techniques such as fault tree analysis, event tree analysis and
Bayesian networks. 
iv. Make judgements of the likelihood of the events and their con-
sequences, and establish a risk description or characterisation. 
v. Evaluate risk, to judge the signiﬁcance of the risk. 
i. Risk treatment. 
n addition, implementation issues related to the risk management
rocess need to be mentioned, see for example ISO (2009b), Banks
nd Dunn (2003) and Teng, Thekdi, and Lambert (2012, 2013 ). 
The risk assessments provide decision support in choosing be-
ween alternatives, the acceptance of activities and products, the
mplementation of risk-reducing measures, etc. The generation of
he risk-information is often supplemented with decision analysis
ools such as cost-beneﬁt analysis, cost-effectiveness analysis and
ulti-attribute analysis. All these methods have in common that
hey are systematic approaches for organising the pros and cons
f a decision alternative, but they differ with respect to the ex-
ent to which one is willing to make the factors in the problem
xplicitly comparable. Independent of the tool, there is always a
eed for a managerial review and judgement, which sees beyond
he results of the analysis and adds considerations linked to the
nowledge and lack of knowledge on which the assessments are
ased, as well as issues not captured by the analysis, as was dis-
ussed in Section 2 . The degree of “completeness” of an analysis
epends on the quality of the analysis and applied cut-offs ( SRA,
015b ). 
For a review of some alternative recent decision analytical ap-
roaches, see Gilboa and Marinacci (2013) . This reference provides
ome interesting historical and philosophical reﬂections on the
oundations of the Bayesian and the expected utility based per-
pectives to decision-making under uncertainty. 
From this basis, considerable work on risk management princi-
les and strategies has been conducted in recent years. A pioneer-
ng work was carried out by Klinke and Renn (2002) , who offered
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e   new classiﬁcation of risk types and management strategies. The
cheme includes seven aspects of uncertainty and the extent of
amage, e.g. delay effects and the geographical dispersion of the
amage, and the potential of mobilisation the risk may have. For
ach risk type, a set of risk management strategies is deﬁned. The
ork integrates the three major strategies for managing risk as dis-
ussed above: risk-informed, cautionary/precautionary and discur-
ive strategies ( Aven & Cox, 2015 ). 
Risk management is closely related to policy and policy anal-
sis. A policy can be deﬁned as a principle or plan to guide de-
isions and achieve desirable outcomes, and the term applies to
nternational organisations, governments, private sector organiza-
ions and groups, as well as individuals. The development and
peration of policies are often structured by the following stages
nspired by decision theory (e.g. Althaus, Bridgman, & Davis, 2007 ):
1. Problem identiﬁcation—the recognition of an issue that de-
mands further attention 
2. Generating alternatives, analysis 
3. Processing covering aspects like policy instrumentation devel-
opment, consulting, deliberation and coordination 
4. Decision-making 
5. Implementation 
6. Evaluation (assessing the effectiveness of the policy) 
Linking stage 6 with 1, the process is referred to as the policy
ycle. It has similar elements as we ﬁnd in the quality and project
anagement ﬁeld for ensuring continuous improvement—plan, do,
tudy and act. The above steps (i)–(vi) for the risk analysis process
an also be structured in line with this cycle. The risk ﬁeld pro-
ides input to the elements of the policy process for example by: 
• Conceptualization and characterization of the problem/issue,
covering aspects like objectives, criteria, risk, uncertainties,
knowledge and priorities. 
• Structuring the problem by clarifying and highlighting key prin-
ciples (e.g. the precautionary principle) and dilemmas, such as
the balance between development and value creation on one
side and protection on the other. 
• Statistical data analysis to identify those hazards/threats that
contribute the most to risk, and in this way guide the decision
making on where to most effectively reduce the risk. 
• Risk assessments and in particular Quantiﬁed Risk Assessment
(QRA) of alternative potential developments (for examples tech-
nological arrangements and systems), to be able to compare the
risk for these alternatives and relate them to possible criteria,
and other concerns such as costs. 
• Risk perception and related studies, providing insights about
how different actors perceive the risk and what concerns they
have regarding the risk and the potential consequences. 
.1. Precautionary principle 
Few policies for risk management have created more contro-
ersy than the precautionary principle, and it is still being dis-
ussed; see for example Aven (2011b), Cox (2011), Lofstedt (2003),
unstein (2005), Peterson (20 06), Renn (20 08) ) and Aldred (2013) .
wo common interpretations are ( SRA, 2015a ): 
- a principle expressing that if the consequences of an activity
could be serious and subject to scientiﬁc uncertainties then
precautionary measures should be taken or the activity should
not be carried out; 
- a principle expressing that regulatory actions may be taken
in situations where potentially hazardous agents might induce
harm to humans or the environment, even if conclusive evi-
dence about the potential harmful effects is not (yet) available. p  Acknowledging the ideas of Fig. 1 , the principle has a ratio-
ale, as no method – quantitative risk analysis, cost-beneﬁt anal-
sis or decision theory – can prescribe what the best risk man-
gement policy is in the face of scientiﬁc uncertainties. However,
t does not provide precise guidance on when it is applicable, as
he judgement of what constitute scientiﬁc uncertainties is subject
o value judgements. If for example the scientiﬁc uncertainty is re-
ated to the diﬃculty of establishing a prediction model for the
onsequences ( Aven, 2011b ), subjective judgements are needed to
ecide when this is actually the case. 
Much of the debate on this principle is due to different un-
erstandings of the fundamentals of the risk ﬁeld, for example
elated to risk and uncertainties. If one studies the above refer-
nces, it is evident that the risk ﬁeld needs a stronger conceptual
nity. From the perspective of the present author, a key point is
he difference between the cautionary and precautionary princi-
les ( Aven, 2011b ). The former principle is broader than the pre-
autionary principle, stating that if the consequences of an activ-
ty could be serious and subject to uncertainties, then cautionary
easures should be taken or the activity should not be carried out,
.e. faced with risk we should take action. This principle is used
or all industries. For example in the Norwegian oil and gas indus-
ry there is a requirement that the living quarters of an installa-
ion should be protected by ﬁreproof panels of a certain quality
or walls facing process and drilling areas. There are no scientiﬁc
ncertainties in this case, the phenomena are well-understood, yet
easures are implemented which can be seen as justiﬁed on the
asis of the cautionary principle. One knows that such ﬁres can oc-
ur and then people should be protected if they occur. Of course,
he decision may not be so straightforward in other cases if the
osts are very large. A risk assessment could then provide useful
ecision support, and, in line with the ideas on risk described in
ection 3 , weights should also be placed on the uncertainties. At
he ﬁnal stage the decision-makers need to ﬁnd a balance between
he costs and beneﬁts gained, including the weight to be given to
he cautionary principle. 
In view of the discussion in Section 2 ( Fig. 1 ) and the ﬁrst
art of this Section 5 , proper risk management relies both on be-
ng risk-informed and on cautious (robust/resilient) policies. One of
hese pillars alone is not enough. 
.2. Robustness 
Considerable works have been conducted in recent years related
o robustness in a context of risk and uncertainties; see e.g. Hites,
e Smet, Risse, Salazar-Neumann, and Vincke (2006), Baker, Schu-
ert, and Faber (2008), Roy (2010), Klibi et al. (2010), Joshi and
ambert (2011), Ben-Haim (2012), Fertis et al. (2012), Gabrel, Mu-
at, and Thiele (2014) , and Malek, Baxter, and Hsiao (2015) . Roy
2010) provides a review of research related to robustness. He uses
he term ‘robust’ as an adjective referring to a capacity for with-
tanding “vague approximations” and/or “zones of ignorance” in 
rder to prevent undesirable impacts, notably the degradation of
he properties to be maintained. In this view, the research dealing
ith robustness seeks to insure this capacity as much as possi-
le. Robustness is related to a process that responds to a concern:
he need for a capacity for resistance or self-protection. Gabrel et
l. (2014) present a review of recent developments in the ﬁeld
f robust optimisation, seeking to ﬁnd the best policies when
arameters are uncertain or ambiguous. Ben-Haim (2012) pro-
ides some overall perspectives on tools and concepts of optimisa-
ion in decision-making, design, and planning, related to risk. The
uthor argues that, in decisions under uncertainty, what should
e optimised is robustness rather than performance; the strat-
gy of satisﬁcing rather than optimising. Joshi and Lambert (2011)
resent an example of a “robust management strategy” using
8 T. Aven / European Journal of Operational Research 253 (2016) 1–13 
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e  diversiﬁcation of engineering infrastructure investments, and Klibi,
Martel, and Guitouni (2010) discuss robustness of supply chain
networks under uncertainty. 
Gabrel et al. (2014) underline some of the challenges of robust
optimisation. They write 
At a high level, the manager must determine what it means for
him to have a robust solution: is it a solution whose feasibility
must be guaranteed for any realization of the uncertain param-
eters? or whose objective value must be guaranteed? or whose
distance to optimality must be guaranteed? The main paradigm
relies on worst-case analysis: a solution is evaluated using the
realization of the uncertainty that is most unfavorable. The way
to compute the worst case is also open to debate: should it use
a ﬁnite number of scenarios, such as historical data, or contin-
uous, convex uncertainty sets, such as polyhedra or ellipsoids?
The answers to these questions will determine the formulation
and the type of the robust counterpart. Issues of overconser-
vatism are paramount in robust optimization, where the un-
certain parameter set over which the worst case is computed
should be chosen to achieve a trade-off between system perfor-
mance and protection against uncertainty, i.e., neither too small
nor too large. ( Gabrel et al., 2014 ) 
Aven and Hiriart (2013) illustrate some of these points. Using a
simple investment model, it is demonstrated that there are a num-
ber of ways the robust analysis can be carried out—none can be ar-
gued to be more natural and better than others. This points to the
need for a cautious policy in making conclusions on what is the
best decision, with reference to one particular robustness scheme.
It is concluded that there is a necessity to see the robustness anal-
yses as nothing more than decision support tools that need to be
followed up with a managerial review and judgement. It is under-
lined that such analyses should be supplemented with sensitivity
analyses showing the optimal investment levels for various param-
eter values followed by qualitative analyses providing arguments
supporting the different parameter values. 
5.3. Resilience 
Resilience types of strategies play a key role in meeting risk,
uncertainties, and potential surprises. The level of resilience for a
system or organisation is linked to the ability to sustain or restore
its basic functionality following a stressor. A resilient system has
the ability to ( Hollnagel, Woods, & Leveson, 2006 ): 
• respond to regular and irregular threats in a robust yet ﬂexible
(adaptive) manner, 
• monitor what is going on, including its own performance, 
• anticipate risk events and opportunities, 
• learn from experience. 
Through a mix of alertness, quick detection, and early response,
the failures can be avoided. Considerable work has been conducted
on this topic in recent years; see for example Weick and Sutcliffe
(2007), Lundberg and Johansson (2015), Sahebjamnia, Torabi, and
Mansouri (2015), Patterson and Wears (2015), Righi, Saurin, and
Wachs (2015) and Bergström, van Winsen, and Henriqson (2015) .
The Weick and Sutcliffe reference addresses the concept of collec-
tive mindfulness, linked to High Reliability Organisations (HROs),
with its ﬁve principles: preoccupation with failure, reluctance to
simplify, sensitivity to operations, commitment to resilience and
deference to expertise. There is a vast amount of literature (see e.g.
Hopkins, 2014; Le Coze, 2013; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstf eld, 1999 )
providing arguments for organisations to organise their effort s in
line with these principles in order to obtain high performance
(high reliability) and effectively manage risks, the unforeseen and
potential surprises. According to Righi et al. (2015) , resilience engineering supports
tudies in risk assessments, identiﬁcation and classiﬁcation of re-
ilience, training and accident analysis, and it should be seen in
elation to the theory of complex systems. Bergström et al. (2015)
onﬁrm this and argue that “resilience engineering scholars typ-
cally motivate the need for their studies by referring to the in-
erent complexities of modern socio-technical systems; complex-
ties that make these systems inherently risky. The object of re-
ilience then becomes the capacity to adapt to such emerging risks
n order to guarantee the success of the inherently risky system”
 Bergström et al., 2015 ). Although resilience is a generic term, it is
ost used in the safety domain, whereas robustness is most com-
only referred to in business and operational research contexts. 
Traditional risk assessments are based on causal chains and
vent analysis, failure reporting and risk assessments, calculating
istorical data-based probabilities. This approach has strong limita-
ions in analysing complex systems as they treat the system as be-
ng composed of components with linear interactions, using meth-
ds like fault trees and event trees, and have mainly a historical
ailure data perspective. These problems are addressed in resilience
ngineering, which argues for more appropriate models and meth-
ds for such systems; see e.g. Hollnagel et al. (2006) . Alterna-
ive methods have been developed, of which FRAM and STAMP
re among the most well-known ( Hollnagel, 2004; Leveson 2004 ,
011 ). At ﬁrst glance, resilience engineering seems to be in conﬂict
ith risk management as it rejects the traditional risk assessments,
ut there is no need for such a conﬂict. With suﬃciently broad
isk management frameworks, the resilience dimension is a part of
isk management as was highlighted at the beginning of this sec-
ion, and discussed for example by Steen and Aven (2011) and Aven
2015b) . The latter reference relates to the antifragility concept of
aleb (2012) , which builds on and extends the resilience concept.
he key message of Taleb is that to obtain top performance over
ime one has to acknowledge and even “love” some level of varia-
ion, uncertainty and risk. Taleb (2012 , pp. 4–5) proposes “to stand
urrent approaches to prediction, prognostication, and risk man-
gement on their heads”. However, as discussed above, there is no
onﬂict here if risk and risk management are suﬃciently framed
nd conceptualised. Proper risk management needs to incorporate
hese ways of thought, which relate risk to performance and im-
rovement processes over time. 
.4. Large/deep uncertainties 
The above analysis covers in particular situations characterised
y large or deep uncertainties, such as in preparing for cli-
ate change and managing emerging diseases. What policies and
ecision-making schemes should be implemented in such cases?
raditional statistical methods and techniques are not suitable, as
elevant supporting models cannot easily be justiﬁed and rele-
ant data are missing. The answer is as discussed above, cau-
ionary/precautionary, and robust and resilient approaches and
ethods. 
Cox (2012) reviews and discusses such approaches and methods
o meet deep uncertainties. He argues that the robust and adap-
ive methods provide genuine breakthroughs for improving pre-
ictions and decisions in such cases. Ten tools that “can help us
o better understand deep uncertainty and make decisions even
hen correct models are unknown are looked into: (subjective)
xpected utility theory; multiple priors, models or scenarios, ro-
ust control, robust decisions; robust optimisation; average mod-
ls; resampling; adaptive boosting; Bayesian model averaging; low
egret online detection; reinforcement learning; and model-free re-
nforcement learning”. These tools are founded on two strategies:
ﬁnding robust decisions that work acceptably well for many mod-
ls (those in the uncertainty set); and adaptive risk management,
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b  
s  
f  r learning what to do by well-designed and analysed trial and er-
or” ( Cox, 2012 ). 
Adaptive analysis is based on the acknowledgement that one
est decision cannot be made but rather a set of alternatives
hould be dynamically tracked to gain information and knowledge
bout the effects of different courses of action. On an overarching
evel, the basic process is straightforward: one chooses an action
ased on broad considerations of risk and other aspects, monitors
he effect, and adjusts the action based on the monitored results
 Linkov et al., 2006 ). In this way we may also avoid the extreme
vents. See also Pettersen (2013) who discusses abductive thinking,
hich is closely linked to adaptive analysis. 
Aven (2013b) provides some reﬂections on some of the founda-
ional pillars on which the work by Cox (2012) is based, including
he meaning of the concept of deep uncertainty. He also provides
ome perspectives on the boundaries and limitations of analytical
pproaches for supporting decision-making in the case of such un-
ertainties, highlighting the need for managerial review and judge-
ents, as was discussed in Section 2 . 
For some alternative perspectives on how to meet deep un-
ertainties, see Karvetski and Lambert (2012) and Lambert et al.
2012) , who seek to turn the conventional robustness discussion
way from its urgency to know which action is most robust
nd towards identifying which are the uncertainties that matter
ost, which matter least, which present opportunities, and which
resent threats, and why. See also Hamilton, Lambert, and Valverde
2015) . 
.5. Surprises and black swans 
Taleb (2007) made the black swan metaphor well-known and it
s widely used today. His work has inspired many authors, also on
oundational issues (e.g., Aven, 2015a; Chichilnisky, 2013; Feduzi &
unde, 2014; Masys, 2012 ), and recently there has been a lively
iscussion about the meaning of the black swan metaphor and its
se in risk management; see Haugen and Vinnem (2015) and Aven
2015d, 2015e ). The metaphor has created a huge interest in risk,
n particular among lay persons. It has also created increased focus
n the professional risk analysis society about risk, knowledge and
urprises. Different types of black swans have been deﬁned and
easures to meet them discussed (e.g. Aven, 2015d; Aven & Krohn,
014; Paté-Cornell, 2012 ). But it is just a metaphor and cannot re-
lace the need for conceptual precision linked to terms such as
risk’, ‘probability’ and ‘knowledge’. As highlighted by Aven (2015b) ,
he basic idea of addressing black swans is to obtain a stronger
ocus on issues not covered by the traditional risk perspectives,
ighlighting historical data, probabilities and expected values (the
orld of Mediocristan in Taleb’s terminology). Surprises do occur
elative to the beliefs determined by these measures and concepts
historical data, probabilities and expected values). We need to get
ore focus on the world outside Mediocristan, what Taleb refers
o as Extremistan. Approaches to meet the potential surprises and
lacks swans include improved risk assessments better capturing
he knowledge dimension, and adaptive and resilient (antifragile)
hinking and analysis, as discussed in the references mentioned in
his paragraph. 
.6. Risk criteria 
Risk management is about balancing different concerns, prof-
ts, safety, reputation, etc. In general one considers a set of alter-
atives, evaluates their pros and cons, and makes a decision that
est meets the decision-makers’ values and priorities. In this pro-
ess, it is common to introduce constraints, in particular related to
afety aspects, to simplify the overall judgements and ensure someinimum level on speciﬁc areas, to avoid the consideration of too
any variables at the same time. 
Such constraints are often referred to as risk criteria, risk accep-
ance criteria and tolerability criteria; see e.g. Rodrigues, Arezes,
nd Leão (2014) and Vanem (2012) . For example, in Norway the
etroleum regulations state that the operator has a duty to formu-
ate risk acceptance criteria relating to major accidents and to the
nvironment. This practice is in line with the internal control prin-
iple, which states that the operator has the full responsibility for
dentifying the hazards and seeing that they are controlled. This
ractice is, however, debated, and in a recent paper Abrahamsen
nd Aven (2012) argue that it should be reconsidered. It is shown
hat if risk acceptance criteria are to be introduced as a risk man-
gement tool, they should be formulated by the authorities, as is
he common practice seen in many countries and industries, for
xample in the UK. Risk acceptance criteria formulated by the in-
ustry would not in general serve the interest of the society as a
hole. The main reason is that an operator’s activity usually will
ause negative externalities to society (an externality is an eco-
omically signiﬁcant effect due to the activities of an agent/ﬁrm
hat does not inﬂuence the agent’s/ﬁrm’s production, but which
nﬂuences other agents’ decisions). The increased losses for soci-
ty imply that society wants to adopt stricter risk acceptance cri-
eria than those an operator ﬁnds optimal in its private optimiza-
ion problem. The expected utility theory, which is the backbone
or most economic thinking, is used as a basis for the discussion. 
The critique against the use of such criteria also covers other
spects; see e.g. Aven (2015a) . Firstly, tolerability or acceptance
evels expressed through probability ignore important aspects of
isk as discussed in Sections 3 and 4 . A key point is that the
trength of knowledge on which the probability judgements are
ased, is not reﬂected in the probabilities used for comparing with
hese levels. Secondly, the use of such criteria can easily lead to
he wrong focus, namely meeting the criteria rather than ﬁnd-
ng the best possible solutions and measures, taking into account
he limitations of the analysis, uncertainties not reﬂected by the
nalysis, and other concerns important for the decision-making. As
trongly highlighted by for example Apostolaksis (2004) , a risk de-
ision should be risk-informed, not risk-based. There is always a
eed for managerial review and judgement, as indicated by Fig. 1. 
The ALARP principle (ALARP: As Low As Reasonably Practi-
able) is a commonly adopted risk-reduction principle, which is
ased on both risk-informed and cautionary/precautionary think-
ng. The principle is founded on the idea of gross disproportion and
tates that a risk-reducing measure shall be implemented unless
t can be demonstrated that the costs are in gross disproportion
o the beneﬁts gained. The principle’s practical implementation is
till a matter of discussion and research; see e.g. Ale, Hartford,
nd Slater (2015), French, Bedford, and Atherton (2005), Melch-
rs (2001), Vinnem, Witsø, and Kristensen (2006) and Jones-Lee
nd Aven (2011) . It is tempting to use cost-beneﬁt analysis, calcu-
ating expected net present values or expected costs per expected
aved lives, to verify the gross disproportionate criterion. And this
s commonly done, but should be used with care as these cost-
eneﬁt criteria do not adequately reﬂect the uncertainty compo-
ent of risk ( Aven & Abrahamsen, 2007 ). Uncertainty assessments
xtending beyond the cost-beneﬁt analyses consequently need to
e supplemented with broader processes, as discussed for exam-
le by Aven and Vinnem (2007) . 
.7. Integrative perspectives 
Again we can see aspects of integrative thinking, the tension
eing caused by the different perspectives, traditional risk analy-
is, resilience and antifragility, leading to broader risk management
rameworks incorporating all these elements. Several frameworks
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 have been developed with such an aim, e.g. the risk frameworks of
Renn (2008) and Aven and Krohn (2014) . This former approach has
a perspective of governance and combines scientiﬁc evidence with
economic considerations as well as social concerns and societal
values. The latter framework builds on risk thinking as described
in Section 3 , focuses on knowledge building, transfer of experience
and learning, and adds theories and practical insights from other
ﬁelds speciﬁcally addressing the knowledge dimension. Three areas
are given main attention, ﬁrstly the collective mindfulness concept
linked to High Reliability Organisations (HROs), with its ﬁve prin-
ciples mentioned above. The second area relates to the quality dis-
course, with its focus on variation, system thinking and continuous
improvements ( Bergman & Klefsjö, 2003 ; Deming, 2000 ), while the
third includes the concept of antifragility ( Taleb, 2012 ). 
6. The future of risk assessment and management 
The future of risk assessment and risk management is dis-
cussed in SRA (2015b) and Aven and Zio (2014) ; see also reviews
and reﬂections by Venkatasubramanian (2011), Pasman and Reniers
(2014) and Khan, Rathnayaka, and Ahmed (2015) . 
A key challenge is related to the development of the risk ﬁeld,
as outlined in Section 2 , having a focus on knowledge and lack of
knowledge characterisations, instead of accurate risk estimations
and predictions, to meet situations of large uncertainties. Today
risk assessments are well established in situations with consider-
able data and clearly deﬁned boundaries for their use. Statistical
and probabilistic tools have been developed and provide useful de-
cision support for many types of applications. However, risk deci-
sions are, to an increasing extent, about situations characterised by
large uncertainties and emergence. Such situations call for differ-
ent types of approaches and methods, and it is a main challenge
for the risk ﬁeld to develop suitable frameworks and tools for this
purpose ( SRA, 2015b ). There is a general research focus on dynamic
risk assessment and management rather than static or traditional
risk assessment. 
The concept of emerging risk has gained increasing attention
in recent years. Flage and Aven (2015 ) perform an in-depth anal-
ysis of the emerging risk concept and in particular its relation
to black swan type of events through the known/unknown. Ac-
cording to this work, we face emerging risk related to an activ-
ity when the background knowledge is weak but contains indica-
tions/justiﬁed beliefs that a new type of event (new in the context
of that activity) could occur in the future and potentially have se-
vere consequences to something humans value. The weak back-
ground knowledge inter alia results in diﬃculty specifying conse-
quences and possibly also in fully specifying the event itself; i.e.,
in diﬃculty specifying scenarios. 
We need to further develop risk assessments that are able to
capture these challenges linked to the knowledge dimension and
the time dynamics. A pure probabilistic approach, for example a
Bayesian analysis, would not be feasible as the background knowl-
edge – the basis for the probability models and assignments –
would be poor. There is a need to balance different risk manage-
ment strategies in an adaptive manner, including cautionary strate-
gies and attention to signals and warnings. 
There is also a need for substantial research and development
to obtain adequate modelling and analysis methods – beyond the
“traditional” ones – to “handle” different types of systems. Exam-
ples include critical infrastructures (e.g. electrical grids, transporta-
tion networks, etc.), which are complex systems and often inter-
dependent, i.e. “systems of systems”. Another example is security-
type applications, where qualitative assessments are often per-
formed on the basis of judgements of actors’ intentions and capac-
ities, without reference to a probability scale. There seems to be a
huge potential for signiﬁcant improvements in the way security isssessed by developing frameworks that integrate the standard se-
urity approaches and ways of assessing and treating uncertainty.
he paper by Aven (2013c) provides an example of a work in this
irection. 
Societal risk decision-making is more and more challenging—
t is characterised by many and diverse stakeholders. Some of the
hallenges and research issues that need to be focused on, here,
elate to, inter alia ( Aven & Zio, 2014; SRA, 2015b ): 
- “how the outcomes of the risk and uncertainties assessment
should be best described, visualised and communicated, for
their informative use in the above described process of societal
decision-making involving multiple and diverse stakeholders, 
- how issues of risk acceptability need to be seen in relation to
the measurement tools used to make judgements about risk ac-
ceptability, accounting for the value generating processes at the
societal level, 
- how the managerial review and judgement should be deﬁned
in this context. 
ey issues that we need to address are: 
- In intergenerational decision-making situations, what are the
available frameworks and perspectives to be taken? What are
other options? When are different frameworks more appropri-
ate than others? How do we capture the key knowledge issues
and uncertainties of the present and future? What duty of care
do we owe to future generations? 
- How can we describe and represent the results of risk assess-
ments in a way that is useful to decision-makers, which clearly
presents the assumptions made and their justiﬁcation with re-
spect to the knowledge upon which the assessment is based? 
- How can we display risk information without misrepresenting
what we know and do not know? 
- How can we accurately represent and account for uncertainties
in a way that properly justiﬁes conﬁdence in the risk results? 
- How can we state how good expert judgements are, and how
can we improve them? 
- In the analysis of near-misses, how should we structure the
multi-dimensional space of causal proximity among different
scenarios in order to measure “how near is a miss to an actual
accident”?”
The above list covers issues ranging from important features
f risk assessment to overall aspects concerning risk management
nd governance. It can obviously be extended. One example to add
s the link between sustainability and risk, which is an emerging
esearch topic; see e.g. Fahimnia et al. (2015) and Giannakis and
apadopoulos (2016) . 
. Conclusions 
Risk assessment and risk management are established as a sci-
ntiﬁc ﬁeld and provide important contributions in supporting
ecision-making in practice. Basic principles, theories and meth-
ds exist and are developing. This review paper has placed its fo-
us on recent work and advances covering the fundamental ideas
nd thinking on which the risks ﬁelds are based. Having evaluated
 considerable number of papers in this area, the following main
onclusions are drawn: 
1. The scientiﬁc foundation of risk assessment and risk manage-
ment is still somewhat shaky on some issues, in the sense that
both theoretical work and practice rely on perspectives and
principles that could seriously misguide decision-makers. Ex-
amples include the general conception of risk as an expected
value or a probability distribution. 
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D  2. In recent years several attempts at integrative research have
been conducted, establishing broader perspectives on the
conceptualisation, assessment and management of risk. The
present author sees this way of thinking as essential for de-
veloping the risk ﬁeld and obtaining a strong unifying scientiﬁc
platform for this ﬁeld. These perspectives relate to: 
• Concepts and terms, like risk, vulnerability, probability, etc. 
• The emphasis on knowledge and lack of knowledge descrip-
tions and characterisations in risk assessments 
• The way uncertainty is treated in risk assessments 
• The way the risk thinking is combined with principles and
methods of robustness and resilience 
• The acknowledgement of managerial review and judgement
in risk management 
3. There are signs of a revitalisation of the interest in foundational
issues in risk assessment and management, which is welcomed
and necessary for meeting the challenges the risk ﬁeld now
faces, related to societal problems and complex technological
and emerging risks. 
It is hoped that the present review and discussion can in-
pire more researchers to take part in this work, building a
tronger platform for risk assessment and management, meeting
urrent and future challenges, in particular related to situations of
arge/deep uncertainties and emerging risks. The risk ﬁeld needs
ore researchers that have the passion and enthusiasm to bring
his ﬁeld to the next level. 
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